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AMERICAN AIRLINES' BANKRUPTCY-IS AMERICAN
READY FOR TAKEOFF AFTER REJECTING ITS
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT?
MATTHEW T. MoRAN*
ANOTHER BANKRUPTCY, another defeat for organized la-
or. In the latest courtroom saga pitting management
against organized labor, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of New York initially denied debtor American
Airlines, Inc.'s (American's) motion to reject its collective bar-
gaining agreement (CBA) with its pilots' union;1 however, that
labor victory was short-lived, as the judge granted American's
renewed motion less than one month later.' The court origi-
nally denied American's motion on two narrow grounds: that
American's proposed changes to codesharing3 and pilot fur-
loughs went too far.4 What some initially thought was "a rare
Chapter 11 victory for labor" and "a significant setback for man-
agement,"5 actually turned out to be a victory for American
when the court properly granted the renewed motion under
Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code.5 Yet, the court should
have gone further: it should have granted the original motion.
* Matt Moran is a candidate for Juris Doctor, May 2014, at SMU Dedman
School of Law. He received his B.B.A. in finance from the University of Notre
Dame in 2010. Matt would like to thank his friends and family, especially his
father, for their love and support during law school.
In re AMR Corp.. 477 B.R. 384, 394 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).
2 In re AMR Corp., 478 B.R. 599, 602 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).
3 Codesharing is an "arrangement where two or more airlines share the same
flight," in which "a seat can be purchased on one airline but is actually operated
by a cooperating airline under a different flight number or code." In re AMR
Corp., 477 B.R. at 402. It permits "single bookings across multiple planes." Id.
4 See id. at 454.
5 Associated Press, Federal judge Bars American Airlines from Dropping Pilots' Con-
tract, for Now, NEWSON6.com (Aug. 16, 2012, 8:41 AM), http://www.newson6.
com/story/19292878/federaljudge-bars-american-airlines-from-dropping-pilots-
contract.
6 In re AMR Corp., 478 B.R. at 602; 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2006).
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American, founded in 1934, is the principal subsidiary of
AMR Corporation.7 It is known as a "network carrier," a term
that also describes Delta Air Lines, United Airlines, and US Air-
ways.' American has approximately 65,000 employees, 70% of
whom are represented by three unions-the Association of Pro-
fessional Flight Attendants (APFA), the Allied Pilots Association
(APA), and the Transit Workers Union of America, AFL CIO
(TWU)-under nine separate CBAs.'
American has struggled to compete in the market due to high
labor costs coupled with low productivity, mergers and restruc-
turings among its competitors, and increased competition from
low-cost carriers.o American's poor financial performance is
borne out in its "costs per available seat mile," which is signifi-
cantly higher than most of its competitors." The primary reason
is labor costs, which are "approximately 24% higher than the
average of the other network carriers and 79% higher than the
average of the [low-cost carriers]."12 American also faces low
productivity among its pilots, whose labor costs total $1.8 billion
per year and are among the highest of American's network com-
petitors-"a fact essentially conceded by the APA.""
In 2011, not only did American lose over $1 billion, but it was
also the only network carrier that failed to earn a profit that
year. 4 In fact, American has lost more than $10 billion since
2001.5 By 2011, however, every other major network carrier had
undergone reorganization through bankruptcy at least once.1 6
Continental Airlines filed for bankruptcy in 1990, United and
US Airways in 2002, US Airways (again) in 2004, and both Delta
and Northwest Airlines in 2005." In addition to these reorgani-
7 In re AMR Corp., 477 B.R. at 395.
8 Id. (identifying a "network carrier" as an airline among "the surviving set of
large carriers, most of which were established long before deregulation, that op-
erate on a hub and spoke traffic model, service a wide variety of both domestic
and international destinations using multiple aircraft types, and have workforces
relatively more senior than the newer entrants").
9 Id. at 393, 395.
10 Id. at 398.
11 Id. at 399.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 400.
14 Id. at 397.
15 Id.
16 See id. at 400.
17 Associated Press, American Joins Long List of Airline Bankruptcies, BOSTON.COM




zations, Delta recently merged with Northwest, and United re-
cently combined with Continental." American finally filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy on November 29, 2011."
American unveiled its new six-year business plan approxi-
mately two months later.20 The plan included setting up a sus-
tainable cost structure and attracting "high value" customers
since the airline could not compete with low-cost carriers on
price.2 1 American provided term sheets based on its business
plan, which contained modifications to each CBA and asked for
a 20% reduction in costs across the board,. $1.25 billion of which
would be from labor. American entered into negotiations with
its unions regarding the modifications, even offering a new term
sheet on March 21, 2012.23 Unable to reach an agreement, how-
ever, American filed a motion to reject the CBAs on March 27,
2012.24 After a three-week trial, but before the court made its
ruling, American reached an agreement for a new CBA with the
TWU and made enough progress with the APEA that it asked
the court to rule on the motion only with respect to the APA.2 5
Therefore, the sole issue before the court was whether Ameri-
can could reject its CBA with the APA under Section 1113 of the
Bankruptcy Code. 26 Section 1113 was enacted in 1984 in re-
sponse to the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Bildisco &
Bildisco 7 and sought to replace Bildisco's generous standard with
one more favorable to upholding CBAs.2 ' Even though Con-
gress enacted this section to be more labor-friendly than Bildisco,
one recent study of over 300 large Chapter 11 bankruptcies
found that courts have rejected thirty-two out of thirty-two CBAs
in contested Section 1113 motions.2 9
18 In re AMR Corp., 477 B.R. at 395.
19 Id. at 401.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 401-02.
22 Id. at 403.
23 Id. at 404.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 393.
26 Id.
27 465 U.S. 513, 526 (1984) (holding that a CBA may be rejected by a showing
that the agreement "burdens the estate, and that after careful scrutiny, the equi-
ties balance in favor of rejecting the labor contract").
28 In re AMR Corp., 477 B.R. at 405.
29 Andrew B. Dawson, Collective Bargaining Agreements in Corporate Reorganiza-
tions, 84 Am. BANKR. L.J. 103, 116 (2010).
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The debtor must meet seven requirements to reject its CBA
under Section 1113. Before filing the motion, it must have pro-
posed to the union modifications that: (1) are "necessary" to its
reorganization; (2) treat all parties "fairly and equitably"; and
(3) are "based on the most complete and reliable information
available."so In addition, the debtor must show that: (4) it has
shared with the union all information necessary to evaluate its
proposal; (5) it has negotiated in good faith; (6) the union has
rejected the proposal without "good cause"; and (7) the "bal-
ance of the equities clearly favors" the motion.3
The court denied American's Section 1113 motion on the
grounds that the airline failed to establish that its proposed
changes to codesharing and pilot furloughs were "necessary" for
reorganization, even though the remaining six requirements of
Section 1113 were met.3 2 The court began its analysis by consid-
ering the APA's objections that several of the proposed changes
were not "necessary" for reorganization, breaking the objections
down into three groups: (1) blanket objections; (2) objections
to proposed changes in benefits; and (3) objections to proposed
changes relevant only to pilots.3 3 For its motion to succeed,
American had to "show that its proposed modifications to the
[CBA were] necessary for reorganization." 34 But, in this in-
stance, "'necessary' should not be equated with 'essential' or
bare minimum."" The court's "focus should be on the long-
term economic viability" of the debtor rather than on short-term
economics." That is, American was entitled to more than bare
minimum changes in the CBA; it was entitled to make changes
that would result in its long-term economic viability.37
With respect to the blanket objections, the APA argued that a
merger between American and US Airways was inevitable, "given
recent consolidation in the airline industry," and American was
30 In re AMR Corp., 477 B.R. at 393; see alo 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b) (1) (2006).
31 In re AMR Corp., 477 B.R. at 393; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b) (2)-(c).
32 In re AMR Corp, 477 B.R. at 454.
3 Id. at 411.
3 Id. at 407.
35 Truck Drivers Local 807, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Carey Transp., Inc., 816
F.2d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 1987); but see Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steel-
workers, 791 F.2d 1074, 1088-89 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that "necessary" is sy-
nonymous with "essential" and that the court should focus on the "shorter term
goal of preventing . .. liquidation ... rather than the longer term issue of the
debtor's ultimate future").
36 In re Delta Air Lines, Inc., 359 B.R. 468, 477 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
37 See In re AMR Corp., 477 B.R. at 407.
202 [ 78
AMERICAN AIRLINE'S BANKRUPTCY
obligated "to pursue such a merger before availing itself of Sec-
tion 1113 relief."3 ' The court disagreed, noting that "there [was]
no evidence before the [c]ourt of a proposed merger between
the two airlines," "[n]or [was] there evidence that the two air-
lines ha[d] reached an agreement in principle."3 The court
overruled the APA's objections regarding the new business
plan-finding testimony from American's experts to be more
credible-and also overruled an argument that labor costs
would converge with American's competitors by 2014-finding
it unpersuasive in light of the airline's $1 billion loss the previ-
ous year.40 With respect to the second group of objections
(changes in benefits), the APA argued that American should
seek fewer concessions because it undervalued those savings.
The court once again found the APA's argument unavailing."
The third group of APA objections under the "necessary"
prong dealt with proposed changes affecting only pilots-
changes regarding regional jets, codesharing, furloughs, sched-
uling, and sick leave. 2 Regional jets are not flown by APA mem-
bers, so it was not surprising that the APA objected to
American's plan to use regional jets with larger seating capacity
despite the fact that "smaller regional jets of [fifty] seats or less
are not fuel efficient and are no longer manufactured due to a
lack of commercial viability."" In fact, all of American's major
competitors-each of whom earned a profit last year-use re-
gional jets with more than fifty seats.44 The APA also objected to
American's plan to increase the maximum number of hours pi-
lots can work in one month, even though American "ha[d] the
lowest schedule maximum among network carriers."4 5 Even
more, the APA objected to American's plan to decrease sick
leave pay, even though "American's pilots also use [d] more sick
leave than any of their network airline peers." 6 The court, fol-
lowing industry standards, overruled the APA's objections re-
garding regional jets, scheduling, and sick leave.4
3 Id. at 411.
3 Id. at 412.
40 Id. at 417, 422.
41 Id. at 425-26.
42 Id. at 411. The APA also had an objection to the valuation of American's
March 21 proposal, but this objection was overruled by the court. Id. at 436.
4 Id. at 427-29.
- Id.
4 Id. at 435.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 428, 435, 436.
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Industry standards worked in favor of the APA on the two re-
maining objections, however: codesharing and furloughs. The
court upheld the APA's objection to codesharing because Amer-
ican's attempt to expand the practice would have resulted in no
specific limits and "no other network carrier currently has such
unlimited codesharing."4 8 Looking to industry standards for gui-
dance, the court concluded this time that American's proposal
went too far.49 Similarly, the court agreed with the APA's objec-
tion to American's plan to eliminate all restrictions on the com-
pany's ability to furlough pilots, noting that such a proposal was
not in line with industry standards.o
For the remaining six requirements of the Section 1113 mo-
tion, the court found that American met its burden." Although
American complied with six out of the seven requirements, and
although the court rejected the overwhelming majority of the
APA's arguments and objections, the court ultimately denied
the motion because of the proposed changes to codesharing
and furloughs.12 The court reached this result by analyzing the
industry standards for each of American's proposed changes to
the CBA, overruling objections where the changes fell within in-
dustry norms and upholding objections where the changes were
inconsistent with industry standards. Since the proposal would
have resulted in nearly unlimited codesharing and a sweeping
ability to furlough pilots, the court rejected the motion because
the proposed changes were not within industry norms, and
therefore not "necessary" for American to successfully
54
reorganize.
The court could have overruled the APA's objections to those
two changes, however, by focusing on the "long-term economic
48 Id. at 432, 433.
49 Id. at 433.
50 Id. at 434-35.
51 Id. at 437 (finding the modifications were "fair and equitable"); id. at 439
(finding the modifications were based on the "most complete and reliable infor-
mation" and rejecting the APA's contention that it was not provided with relevant
information); id. at 446 (finding the APA had not shown American failed to ne-
gotiate in good faith); id. at 447 (finding the APA did not have a good cause for
rejecting the modifications); id. at 450 (concluding that "the balance of the equi-
ties clearly favor[ed] rejection of the APA agreement").
52 Id. at 454.
53 See id. at 433, 435.
54 However, the judge granted American's renewed motion less than one
month later after the airline limited its codesharing proposal and dropped its




viability" of American.5 5 The court observed that "the pattern
appears the same: the airline enters bankruptcy with labor costs
that are at or near the top of the industry and then emerges with
costs at or near the low end of the group. American now seeks to
follow in the same path."56 Airline bankruptcies appear to be a
never-ending cycle; American's filing is the 100th time a U.S.
carrier has filed for bankruptcy since 1990, including several air-
lines filing multiple times. 7 If history provides a lesson, there is
a reasonable chance American could find itself back in bank-
ruptcy in the near future. So, why not let American delay the
inevitable bankruptcy a few more years by permitting the com-
pany to make the proposed changes to codesharing and fur-
loughs that would place it above industry norms?
By granting the original motion, the court could have enabled
American to emerge from bankruptcy with a slight market ad-
vantage. While some might argue that debtors should not look
to the bankruptcy court to gain market advantages, these two
proposals are relatively minor issues compared to the entire pro-
ceeding and the modest advantages would likely be negotiated
away each time the CBA expires. In fact, given that American
has lost $10 billion since 2001, it will take quite a few years for
these market advantages to even result in a profit.58 In the long-
term, allowing the proposed changes to codesharing and fur-
loughs could allow American to avoid a subsequent bankruptcy
for a few additional years, until its labor costs are once again too
high to be profitable. Given the never-ending cycle of airline
bankruptcy and a stated focus on the long-term economic viabil-
ity of the airline, the court should have permitted American's
proposed changes to codesharing and furloughs even though
they went beyond industry norms.
This case, along with the recent history of Section 1113 cases
involving major corporations, demonstrates the uphill battle un-
ions face when a debtor moves to reject its CBA during bank-
ruptcy. However, the ruling offers key insight into how unions
can succeed on Section 1113 motions in the future. "[A]s was
the case in the Section 1113 proceeding in [the] Northwest
[bankruptcy], the [u]nions here did not offer an alternative
55 See In re Delta Air Lines, Inc., 359 B.R. 468, 477 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
56 In re AMR Corp., 477 B.R. at 419.
57 Tom Bemis, AMR is 100th Airline Bankruptcy Since 1990, WALL ST. J.
MARKETWATCH (Nov. 29, 2011, 11:18 AM), http://blogs.marketwatch.com/
thetell/2011/11/29/amr-is-100th-airline-bankruptcy-since-1990/.
58 See In re AMR Corp., 477 B.R. at 397.
2013] 205
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
stand-alone model to American's Business Plan. . . . The
[u]nions' inability to articulate a different overall vision of a
stand-alone airline is telling."5 9 If unions want to succeed on
these motions in the future, they need to offer viable alternative
economic models, unlike the APA simply offering $260 million
in annual savings without a business plan when American stated
that it needed $370 million in savings to successfully reorganize
and proffered such a model to obtain these savings.o
What gets lost in the Section 1113 argument is the bigger pic-
ture, however, and perhaps the more important question:
whether American will emerge from bankruptcy and begin op-
erating as a profitable airline. As of the date of this note, Ameri-
can has yet to emerge from bankruptcy.61 Furthermore, even
though the APA's arguments over codesharing and furloughs
are what convinced the court to initially deny the motion, the
APA also devoted substantial time arguing that the court should
deny the motion because a merger with US Airways was inevita-
ble. 62 While the court dismissed that argument for reasons men-
tioned above, that does not mean a merger between the two
airlines will not happen. In fact, it appears American purpose-
fully waited until the court ruled before exploring a merger, as
the airline began negotiations with US Airways a few days before
the court granted the renewed motion.6 1 Subsequently, on Feb-
ruary 14, 2013, American and US Airways entered an all-stock
merger agreement, pending approval from regulators and the
court, which would leave AMR creditors owning 72% of the
combined carrier and US Airways' management team in charge
of operational control.64
Nevertheless, American's future still remains uncertain be-
cause it appears the APA did not take its loss in court well. In
59 See id. at 418.
60 See id. at 445.
61 On March 13, 2013, American filed a request to extend its period of exclu-
sivity from April 15 to May 29. American Airlines Requests More Time to File Reorgani-
zation Plan, REUTERS (Mar. 13, 2013, 9:53 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2013/03/14/us-american-reorganization-idUSBRE92DO3K20130314.
62 See In re AMR Corp., 477 B.R. at 416.
63 See Gregory Karp, American, US Airways, British Air in Merger Talks, CHI. TRIB.
(Aug. 31, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-08-31/news/chi-amer-
ican-us-airways-say-they-are-evaluating-potential-merger-20120831_1_merger-talks-
ceo-tom-horton-american-airlines.
64 Soyoung Kim & Karen Jacobs, American to Unite with US Airways to Create No. 1




September 2012, only about 50% of American's flights arrived
on time due to a massive increase in the number of mainte-
nance write-ups by the pilots just before take off, leaving Ameri-
can threatening further legal action.65 One must wonder if the
relationship between the pilots and American management is
simply beyond repair. As a result, this author would hypothesize
that unless the merger is consummated with US Airways or new
management takes over at American, it is unlikely that the air-
line will return to profitability.
Ultimately, the court reached the correct result by granting
American's renewed motion to reject its CBA with the pilots'
union, but it should have gone further by granting the original
motion because the proposed changes to codesharing and fur-
loughs can be seen as necessary under the long-term economic
viability analysis. Only time will tell whether granting the re-
newed Section 1113 motion will spare American from collapse
and allow the airline to successfully emerge from bankruptcy.
.65 Terry Maxon, American Airlines Hit by More Delays, DALAS MORNING NEWS
(Sept. 28, 2012, 9:36 PM), http://www.dallasnews.com/business/airline-indus-
try/20120928-american-hit-by-more-delays-despite-pilot-leader-s-chiding-of-his-
members.ece.
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